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The	economic	consequences	of	Covid-19
Covid-19	will	have	major	economic	consequences	for	Europe,	but	how	large	will	the	costs	prove	to
be?	Iain	Begg	outlines	the	difficult	economic	choices	the	outbreak	poses	for	policymakers	and
analyses	the	long-term	effects	the	economic	downturn	is	likely	to	have.
Rapidly	rising	unemployment	rates	and	warnings	from	many	businesses	about	their	viability	testify	to
the	looming	economic	threats	from	the	Covid-19	health	crisis.	A	sharp	recession	is	already	underway
and	could	see	a	double-digit	percentage	decline	in	global	GDP	in	the	next	quarter,	with	no	real	sense	of	when	it	will
end	or	how	a	recovery	can	be	achieved.
Unlike	the	financial	and	sovereign	debt	crises	a	decade	ago,	this	‘corona’	recession	is	the	result	of	a	deliberate
choice	by	policymakers	to	put	the	economy	into	hibernation.	From	the	perspective	of	public	health,	few	question	the
wisdom	of	this	policy,	but	it	will	have	lasting	effects	and	will	require	careful	handling	if	long-term	economic	damage
is	to	be	minimised.
More	poignantly,	policymakers	have	to	be	sensitive	to	the	social	risks	emanating	from	economic	contraction.	There
is	a	well-established	link	between	poverty	and	poor	health,	raising	the	deeply	unsettling	prospect	of	a	second	wave
of	health	problems	deriving	from	the	economic	impact	of	Covid-19,	rather	than	the	virus	itself.
The	main	economic	effects
As	explained	in	a	new	policy	note	published	by	Funcas,	three	distinct,	though	over-lapping,	economic	effects	can
be	anticipated.	The	first	is	macroeconomic,	with	the	sharp	fall	in	GDP	expected	to	lead	to	a	rapid	increase	in	both
public	and	private	indebtedness,	potentially	leading	to	renewed	financial	instability.
Policymakers,	seasoned	by	their	experiences	of	a	decade	ago,	have	been	quick	to	respond.	Coordinated	action	by
central	banks	has	seen	interest	rates	slashed,	vast	new	injections	of	liquidity,	and	renewed	quantitative	easing.	The
US	Federal	Reserve,	for	example,	has	promised	new	measures	worth	$4	trillion	–	some	20%	of	GDP.
Massive	fiscal	stimulus	packages	have	also	been	agreed.	In	Germany	and	the	UK,	the	headline	totals	are	for
measures	in	excess	of	20	percent	and	15	percent	of	GDP,	respectively.	Spain,	having	already	announced	initiatives
worth	around	8	percent	of	GDP	has	just	added	a	raft	of	additional	measures,	while	the	$2	trillion	US	stimulus	is
more	than	double	the	amount	of	the	Obama	administration	equivalent	in	2009.
The	second	economic	effect	stems	from	the	uneven	incidence	of	the	lock-down	of	economies.	Aviation,	tourism,
leisure	activities	and	non-food	retail	face	an	extended	period	of	inactivity.	Apart	from	the	direct	effect	of	the	virus	on
the	worst	affected	localities	–	such	as	Bergamo	and	adjacent	parts	of	Lombardy,	Madrid,	New	York	and	Wuhan	–
the	economic	woes	could	be	severe	for	localities,	regions	or	entire	countries	dependent	on	these	sectors.
Although	there	will	be	some	offset	from	the	few	sectors	expected	to	gain	from	efforts	to	contain	the	virus	–	not	least
health	care	and	the	industries	supplying	it	with	equipment,	consumables	and	so	on	–	the	risks	to	companies	in
locked	down	sectors	are	acute.	Those	with	heavy	overheads,	whether	large	or	small,	will	quickly	exhaust	their
working	capital	and	face	insolvency.
For	policymakers	there	will	be	a	balancing-act:	they	need	to	provide	support	to	keep	companies	–	or	even	entire
sectors,	such	as	aviation	–	afloat	while	being	alert	to	the	need	to	avoid	interventions	likely	to	leave	a	legacy	of
zombie	companies	when	the	crisis	abates.	Governments	already	heavily	indebted,	notably	Italy,	face	the	further
challenge	of	ensuring	their	own	solvency.
The	fiscal	stimulus	packages,	in	varying	ways,	take	account	of	these	considerations,	with	a	mix	of	grants,	loans	and
loan	guarantees.	The	US	has	earmarked	emergency	loan	funding	for	airlines	and	other	directly	hit	sectors.
Germany	has	created	a	massive	contingency	fund	for	corporate	bailouts,	together	with	provisions	to	fend	off	hostile
takeovers	of	German	companies	made	vulnerable	by	large	drops	in	share	prices,	including	by	direct	purchase	of
the	company’s	equity.	Spain	and	the	UK	extended	their	initial	packages	to	cover	the	self-employed.
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Third,	the	effects	on	households	will	be	profound,	though	again	very	uneven.	Job	losses	will	mean	loss	of	income
and	the	lockdown	will	deter	the	search	for	alternative	jobs,	likely	in	any	case	to	be	scarce.	Households	committed	to
payments	for	rents,	utilities	and	other	regular	outgoings	based	on	previously	credible	expectations	of	a	certain	level
of	income	will	find	themselves	in	financial	jeopardy.	Many	lenders	and	landlords	have	–	so	far	–	shown
understanding,	and	it	has	been	encouraging	to	see	employers	acting	harshly	being	pilloried.	But	how	long	can	this
last?
Here	again,	policy	responses	have	been	forthcoming.	The	US,	for	example,	has	promised	a	cash	payment	to	all
taxpayers	earning	less	than	$100,000	per	year	–	in	effect	a	form	of	basic	income	–	albeit	only	as	a	one-off.	Several
European	countries	have	relaxed	the	terms	for	accessing	benefits	and	many	have	also	introduced	provisions	to
prevent	evictions.
Challenges	for	the	EU
For	the	EU	level,	the	crisis	poses	distinctive	challenges.	The	European	Central	Bank	has	already	acted,	in	concert
with	other	leading	central	banks,	and	is	plainly	ready	to	do	more.	But	in	fiscal	policy,	the	EU	level	is	heavily
constrained.	It	can	help,	though	only	marginally,	to	reinforce	the	fiscal	stimulus	effort	by	accelerating	spending	from
the	EU	budget	and	maybe	a	bit	more	through	loan	guarantees.	It	has	also	signalled	that	obligations	under	EU	fiscal
rules	and	restrictions	on	use	of	state	aids	will	be	eased	or	waived.
But	in	other	respects,	reconciling	standard	‘old’	concerns	about	what	the	EU	should	be	empowered	to	do	and	the
‘new’	realties	is	proving	tricky.	The	unsatisfactory	outcome	of	the	26	March	European	Council,	at	which	proposals
for	new	or	amended	financial	and	budgetary	instruments	were	on	the	table,	left	many	politicians	in	Italy	and	Spain
seething.	The	Eurogroup	has	now	been	charged	with	coming	up	with	revised	proposals	before	Easter.
While	it	is	tempting	to	think	the	EU	should	use	its	own	budget	to	support	action	in	member	states,	the	harsh	reality
is	that	every	euro	spent	by	Brussels	has	to	come	from	member	state	budgets.	For	this	reason,	policy	innovations
based	on	borrowing	offer	much	greater	scope	for	effective	action.	The	two	key	proposals	are	to	enable	the
European	Stability	Mechanism	(ESM)	to	broaden	its	mandate	to	provide	loans	to	countries	to	fund	the	emergency
measures,	and	to	create	new	‘Coronabonds’	as	a	collective	measure	to	help	fund	governments.
The	ESM	route	ought	to	be	straightforward,	but	there	is	the	awkward	complication	of	its	rules	requiring
governments	availing	themselves	of	loans	to	accept	conditions	on	reforming	their	economies.	Italy,	the	most
immediate	likely	case,	has	been	adamant	that	this	is	unacceptable.	Coronabonds	would,	de	facto,	be	a	form	of	debt
mutualisation,	a	step	towards	fiscal	union	which	has	been	staunchly	resisted	up	to	now	by	the	Eurozone’s	creditor
countries.	It	may	be,	in	keeping	with	the	EU’s	longstanding	propensity	only	to	move	forward	in	times	of	crisis,	that
this	will	be	the	time	to	make	the	quantum	leap.
The	longer	term
While	the	policy	responses,	despite	the	difficult	circumstances	of	so	fast-moving	a	crisis,	have	been	impressive,
attention	must	soon	turn	to	what	happens	next.	The	main	challenges	for	the	medium	and	longer	term	can	be
summarised	under	three	main	headings:	exiting	‘economic	hibernation’,	mitigating	the	ensuing	macroeconomic
fallout,	and	limiting	the	damage	to	the	worst	affected	sectors	and	to	households.
Ending	the	lockdown	will	require	careful	judgement	of	when	the	health	imperatives	need	to	give	way	to	the
economic	concerns.	Health	is,	quite	rightly,	uppermost	today,	but	there	will	come	a	point	when	the	knock-on	social
consequences	of	prolonged	downturn	become	more	of	a	concern.	Pity	the	decision-makers	who	have	to	make	this
judgement	of	Solomon.
In	macroeconomic	terms,	there	can	perhaps	be	more	grounds	for	optimism.	The	term	‘macro-prudential’	came	to
prominence	in	2009	as	the	financial	crisis	was	unfolding,	covering	the	interplay	between	fiscal	conditions	and
financial	stability.	All	governments	will	emerge	from	the	crisis	with	increased	debt,	while	financial	systems	are	likely
to	be	more	fragile,	including	as	a	result	of	a	fresh	upsurge	in	non-performing	loans.	But	the	authorities	do	at	least
know	what	it	takes	to	counter	this	and	there	is	also	the	prospect	that	the	recession	will	be	v-shaped:	a	sharp
rebound	after	the	initial	sharp	fall.
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The	outlook	for	households	and	companies	is	where	attention	may	have	to	be	focused.	The	term	‘hysteresis’	is
used	by	labour	economists	to	capture	the	phenomenon	of	unemployment	leading	to	detachment	from	the	labour
market	and	erosion	of	skills,	detracting	from	employability.	Here	again,	policymakers	have	a	toolbox	to	use,
including	active	labour	market	policies.	However,	they	also	need	to	be	aware	that	it	will	be	a	slow	process.
In	the	present	context,	a	more	troubling	scenario	would	be	if	an	equivalent	of	hysteresis	applied	to	employers
because	their	detachment	from	their	markets	damages	their	ability	to	do	business.	Few	will	previously	have
experienced	inactivity	in	anything	like	this	form	–	akin	to	a	lengthy	strike	–	for	what	could	be	a	lengthy	period	has	a
similar	effect	in	eroding	their	ability	to	compete.	This	is	where	new	thinking	is	arguably	most	needed.
In	one	of	his	most	renowned	publications,	The	Economic	Consequences	of	the	Peace,	Maynard	Keynes	bemoaned
“a	Peace	which,	if	it	is	carried	into	effect,	must	impair	yet	further,	when	it	might	have	restored,	the	delicate,
complicated	organization,	already	shaken	and	broken	by	war,	through	which	alone	the	European	peoples	can
employ	themselves	and	live”.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	originally	appeared	at	the	Dahrendorf	Forum.	It	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of
EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	Jorge
Franganillo	(CC	BY	2.0)
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